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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1959 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
REYNALDO RIVERA-CRUZ, 
                 
                                Appellant 
 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(Crim. No. 1-06-cr-00043-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Christopher C. Conner 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 25, 2010 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, and SLOVITER and RENDELL, Circuit Judges,  
 
(Opinion Filed: November 12, 2010) 
 
OPINION 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Reynaldo Rivera-Cruz appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction 
and sentence that was imposed following his guilty plea. His appointed counsel has filed 
a motion to withdraw as counsel and submitted a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738 (1967).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.     
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I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, it is not necessary to recite at length the 
facts of this case.  It is sufficient to note that Rivera-Cruz entered a negotiated guilty plea 
to possession of cocaine hydrochloride with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that the quantity of cocaine 
hydrochloride attributable to Rivera-Cruz was between five and fifteen kilograms.  
Before his sentencing hearing, Rivera-Cruz objected to the presentence report on the 
basis of the drug quantity amount and the two-level enhancement for possession of a 
firearm at the time of the offense.  After receiving testimony at the sentencing hearing, 
the district court overruled both objections.   
 The court found that under the Sentencing Guidelines, Rivera-Cruz’s offense level 
was a 36, his criminal history category was VI, and his Guidelines range was 324-405 
months.  Because the statutory maximum penalty was twenty years, the court restricted 
the Guidelines sentence to 240 months.  The court granted the government’s motion for a 
downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, thereby reducing Rivera-Cruz’s 
offense level to 31, with a Guidelines range of 188-235 months.  The court then 
sentenced Rivera-Cruz to 188 months of imprisonment.  This appeal followed.1
 As noted above, Rivera-Cruz’s appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw 
and an Anders brief stating that he is unable to identify any non-frivolous issues for 
 
                                                          
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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review.  In accordance with LAR 109.2(a), the government and Rivera-Cruz were 
provided with a copy of the Anders brief and both filed response briefs.2
 Counsel identifies five potential issues for appeal and concludes  that they are all 
frivolous.  The issues he identifies are: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to accept the plea; 
(2) the plea is invalid as judged by applicable constitutional and statutory standards; (3) 
the sentence is illegal; (4) the court erred in its drug quantity calculation; and (5) the court 
 
II. 
 When counsel submits an Anders brief, we must determine:  “(1) whether counsel 
adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements [Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 
109.2(a)]; and (2) whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous 
issues.”  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  “[I]f counsel finds his 
case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise 
the court and request permission to withdraw.  That request must, however, be 
accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the 
appeal.”  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  “Under Anders, appellant’s counsel must ‘satisfy the 
court that he or she has thoroughly scoured the record in search of appealable issues’ and 
then ‘explain why the issues are frivolous.’” United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 319 
(3d. Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000)).   
                                                          
2 Rivera-Cruz also filed a pro se motion asking the district court to remove counsel 
and disregard the Anders brief filed by his counsel.  We agree that there are no non-
frivolous issues in Rivera-Cruz’s appeal, and we will therefore deny the motion to 
disregard appellate counsel’s brief.  
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erred in applying the two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm at the time of the 
offense. 
 The first issue clearly would be frivolous because Rivera-Cruz was charged with a 
federal crime; hence, the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.   
 The second issue would be frivolous because Rivera-Cruz’s guilty plea was valid.  
It met the standards set forth in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.  As the record demonstrates, the district court conducted 
a thorough plea colloquy in compliance with Boykin and Rule 11.   
 The third issue would be frivolous because Rivera-Cruz’s sentence clearly was not 
illegal.  The sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum, and it was procedurally and 
substantively reasonable.  A sentence is procedurally reasonable if a district court 
engages in the following three-step process:      
A district court must begin the process by first calculating the applicable 
Guidelines range.  After that initial calculation, the court must then rule on any 
motions for departure and, if a motion is granted, state how the departure affects 
the Guidelines calculation.  Finally, after allowing the parties an opportunity for 
argument, the court must consider all of the § 3553(a) factors and determine the 
appropriate sentence to impose, which may vary from the sentencing range called 
for by the Guidelines.   
 
United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 194-95 (3d Cir. 2008).  The district court 
accurately determined the Guidelines range, granted the government’s motion for a 
downward departure, recalculated the Guidelines range based on the departure, and 
meaningfully considered the § 3553(a) factors.  If a sentence is procedurally sound, it is 
also considered substantively reasonable “unless no reasonable sentencing court would 
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have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district 
court provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d. Cir. 2009).  Here, the 
district court reasonably sentenced Rivera-Cruz to a sentence of 188 months of 
imprisonment.  
 The fourth issue would be frivolous because the district court did not err in its 
drug calculation.  “Judicial factfinding in the course of selecting a sentence within the 
permissible range does not offend the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial 
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 
2007) (en banc).  In determining a sentence, “district courts . . . make factual findings by 
a preponderance of the evidence and courts of appeals . . . review those findings for clear 
error.”  Id. at 561.  The district court found that the quantity of drugs attributable to 
Rivera-Cruz was between five and fifteen kilograms.  Rivera-Cruz admitted to a law 
enforcement official that his offense involved this drug quantity, and he stipulated to the 
drug quantity in his plea agreement.  There can be no doubt that the district court did not 
commit clear error in its drug quantity calculation  
 Lastly, the fifth issue would be frivolous because the district court did not err in 
applying the two-level sentence enhancement for possession of a firearm at the time of 
the offense, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).  Although Rivera-Cruz, in his pro se 
reply brief argues that this enhancement should have been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, factual findings relevant to sentencing enhancements are only required to be 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.  United States v. Fisher, 502 F.3d 293, 307 
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(3d Cir. 2007).  Note (3) of the Commentary to § 2D1.1(b)(1) explains that “[t]he 
enhancement for weapon possession  . . . reflects the increased danger of violence when 
drug traffickers possess weapons.  The enhancement should be applied if the weapon was 
present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.”  
“[D]efendants have rarely been able to overcome the ‘clearly improbable’ hurdle.”  
United States v. Drozdowski, 313 F.3d 819, 822 (3d Cir. 2002).  Here, the guns were 
found in Rivera-Cruz’s bedroom, along with ammunition and drug proceeds, and drugs 
were found in the house.  The district court did not commit clear error in applying the 
two-level enhancement to Rivera-Cruz’s sentence.3
                                                          
3 Although two witnesses testified that the guns found in Rivera-Cruz’s bedroom 
belonged to them, the court found that both witnesses lacked credibility. We cannot 
overturn the district court’s credibility determination because “[c]redibility 
determinations are the unique province of a fact finder . . . . Where the record supports a 
credibility determination, it is not for an appellate court to set it aside.”  United States v. 
Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 177 (3d Cir. 1998).  
 
III. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.  Defense 
counsel’s motion to withdraw will be granted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
